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I.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On January 13, 1998, Defendant George Panagiotou ("Panagiotou"), Panagiotou's
company Pana-Tek, Inc. ("Pana-Tek") and Panagiotou's then wife, Tina Panagiotou (aka
Valcarenghi) entered into an Assignment of Claims Agreement (" 1998 Assignment Agreement
Agreement") with the Trustee of the Gaston & Snow bankruptcy estate, Alfred J. Bianco
("Bianco") for the collection of Bianco's interest in the claims against the Erkins in the Gaston &
Snow bankruptcy. The relevant terms that relate to this lawsuit forth in the 1998 Assignment
Agreement Agreement are as follows:
3(c) The Buyers shall account to, and pay over to, the Seller one-half of any amount in
excess of (i) one hundred thousand ($100,000.00) dollars, and (ii) Buyers reasonable costs of
collection expended or incurred in connection with the prosecution of the Claims from and after
the date of this Agreement, which the Buyers may realize from the prosecution and/or the
settlement of the Claims, provided, however that the amount payable by the Buyers to the Seller
under this paragraph 3(c) shall not in any event exceed six hundred fifty thousand (650,000.00)
dollars.
5. The consideration, if any, to be paid by the Buyers to the Seller pursuant to the terms
of paragraph 3( c) above shall be payable in or within twenty (20) business days of the date when
the Buyers shall realize any such proceeds from the prosecution, and/or settlement and collection
of all or any part of the Claims. In the event that the Buyers shall realize any such proceeds from
one but not all of the Debtors, or shall realize proceeds from time-to-time from any source,
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Buyers shall account to and pay over to the Seller the consideration described in paragraph 3(c)
above until such time as the Seller shall have received the maximum amount of consideration
described in that paragraph.
8. The Seller shall not, from and after the date of execution of this Agreement, act in any
manner to compromise the Claims, to lessen the value of the Claims to the Buyers, or to derogate
from the sale and assignment of the claims contemplated by this Agreement.
9. From and after the date when the Court approves the terms of this Agreement, the
Buyers shall promptly, and at their sole expense, take such steps as may be necessary, in their
judgment or the judgment of its counsel of record, to prosecute zealously the Claims in court and
procure satisfaction of any judgment which Buyers may be awarded with respect to the Claims
against one or all of the Debtors or any person firms, corporations or other business entities
which are or may be liable with respect to the Claims. The steps to be taken shall be determined
by the Buyers and their counsel of record, in the exercise of their reasonab 1e discretion.
10. The Buyers shall keep the Seller reasonably informed of the steps being taken to
prosecute the Claims, and shall promptly provide the Seller or his counsel with copies of all
pleadings, motions and other papers filed in Court in furtherance of such prosecution and
collection of the Claims, together with true and accurate copies of any and all settlement
documentation which may be executed in order to resolve Claims.
On March 20, 1999, Panagiotou and his former attorney Edwin McCabe ("McCabe")
entered into a "Fee, Expense and Distribution Agreement" relating to the proceeds of
Panagiotou's collection of the $3.9 million Judgment against the Erkins as set forth in the 1998
Assignment Agreement. The terms and conditions set forth in the Fee, Expense and Distribution
Agreement were such that any proceeds collected from the Erkins Judgment were paid to
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Panagiotou and McCabe on six (6) conditions precedent before Bianco was entitled to any
proceeds, "if any". This Fee, Expense and Distribution Agreement was rendered null and void
when Panagiotou entered into a Settlement Agreement with the McCabe bankruptcy Trustee on
April 29, 2009.
On February 13, 2001, Pana-Tek, Panagiotou's California Corporation, and McCabe
created a Delaware limited liability corporation known as Erkins Investment Joint Venture, LLC,
in which Panagiotou and McCabe each held a 50% interest which was name was subsequently
changed to GEDCO on October 7, 2002. Panagiotou and McCabe each had a 50% interest in
GEDCO.
On November 22, 2002, Pana-Tek was dissolved and Panagiotou became the successor in
interest and all liability for Pana-Tek.
On February 12, 2002, Panagiotou, on behalf Bianco as Plan Administrator to the Estate
of Gaston & Snow, purchased the Bliss Valley and Devil's Corral property with a $2.4 million
credit bid.
On April 17, 2002, McCabe sent a demand letter to Stoel Rives to amend the Marshal's
Sale Certificate showing Pana-Tek, Inc. as the purchaser of both properties. The Marshal's
amended the Sale Certificate on May 5, 2002. Bianco's name, as it relates to the purchase of the
Bliss Valley and Devil's Corral property, disappeared completely and both properties became the
possession of Pana-Tek (Panagiotou).
On April 9, 2003, Panagiotou and McCabe, through GEDCO, formed two additional
limited liability corporations known as Bliss Valley Properties, LLC ("Bliss Valley") and Devil's
Corral, LLC ("Devil's Corral"). GEDCO is the sole member of Bliss Valley and Devil's Corral.
George Panagiotou is the sole Manager of GEDCO.

7

On June 23, 2003, Panagiotou Quitclaimed all Pana-Tek's right, title and interest in the
Bliss Valley property and Devil's Corral property to Panagiotou. Panagiotou then Quitclaimed
all of Panagiotou's right, title and interest in the Bliss Valley property to Bliss Valley Property,
LLC and the Devil's Corral property to Devil's Corral, LLC.
On May 21, 2003, Robert and Bernardine Erkins filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy in
Florida, Case No. 9:03-bk-l 0502. A 11 U.S.C. 362(a) stay was automatically in place which
extended to the Bliss Valley property and the Devil's Corral property by virtue of the Erkins
pending water rights claim being litigated in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The stay was in
place from May 21, 2003 thru June 6, 2007. It is important to note that Panagiotou never filed a
proper proof of claim for the $2.6 million deficiency judgment he had against the Erkins.
Accordingly, his claim was fully extinguished on the bar date of September 1, 2003.
On September 3, 2003, McCabe filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy in Boston, Massachusetts,
which was subsequently converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy on February 16, 2005. McCabe
identified having a 50% ownership of GEDCO on Schedule B of his bankruptcy petition.
As a result of McCabe's bankruptcy filing, an 11 U.S.C. §362(a) bankruptcy automatic
stay ("McCabe bankruptcy stay") extending to GEDCO was in place as of September 3, 2003.
Since GEDCO was the sole member of Bliss Valley and Devil's Corral, the McCabe bankruptcy
stay also extended to the Bliss Valley and Devil's Corral properties. The McCabe bankruptcy
stay applied to Panagiotou as the sole Manager of GEDCO, Bliss Valley and Devil's Corral and
was in full force and effect until April 29, 2009, when the McCabe Bankruptcy Court approved a
second Settlement Agreement between Panagiotou and the McCabe bankruptcy Trustee Joseph
Braunstein ("Braunstein") wherein Panagiotou feigned poverty, and paid $84,000 to satisfy a
$660,000 judgment entered against Panagiotou for violating the McCabe bankruptcy stay in the
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McCabe bankruptcy Adversary Proceeding, Case No. 05-01447 and for unpaid attorney costs
and fees owed for collection of money from the Erkins Judgment in the McCabe bankruptcy
Adversary proceeding, Case No. 06-01242, and U.S. District Court of Massachusetts Civil
Action No. 05-12208-NMG, which Panagiotou filed against Braunstein.
Upon Panagiotou's payment of the $84,000, in addition to releasing all the McCabe
bankruptcy claims, Braunstein also released the McCabe estates' security interest in GEDCO,
which had been held in escrow pursuant to the December 18, 2006 (first) Settlement Agreement
between Panagiotou and Braunstein, on which Panagiotou had previously defaulted.
On February 27, 2003, Allen Ellis, on behalf of Panagiotou and Panagiotou's defunct
Pana-Tek corporation, filed a malpractice lawsuit in Third District Court, Canyon County against
the Stoel Rives law firm for allegedly conspiring with others to keep Defendants from collecting
on the 1998 Erkins' Judgment pursuant to the 1998 Assignment Agreement.
The Stoel Rives case was concluded on October 13, 2004, when Fourth District Judge
Williamson entered Summary Judgment in favor of Stoel Rives and against Panagiotou.
Pursuant to a settlement agreement between Stoel Rives and Panagiotou, on December 12, 2004,
Panagiotou paid Stoel Rives $175,000 for settlement of the malpractice case and in
satisfaction of over $500,000 in attorney fees and costs expended by Stoel Rives for collection
on the Erkins' Judgment. Panagiotou's payment of $175,000 to Stoel Rives is significant in that
the payment of $175,000 by Panagiotou to Stoel Rives falls under the 1998 Assignment
Agreement, paragraph 3(c)(ii) "Buyer's reasonable costs of collection expended or incurred in
connection with the prosecution of the Claims from and after the effective date of this
Agreement..." Knowing that there was a stay in place as a result of McCabe's bankruptcy filing,
and without the approval of Braunstein, on March 12, 2004, Panagiotou and McCabe, on behalf

9

of Bliss Valley; Devil's Corral; Panagiotou's defunct Pana-Tek corporation; GEDCO, LLC;
McCabe (individually) and The McCabe Group, filed a lawsuit in the Massachusetts Superior
Court, Case No. 04-1100-BLS ("Massachusetts Superior Court action") against Eliopulos, his
company Phoinix Advisors LLC and 16 individuals (including 4 of the Erkins' attorneys) and
entities for allegedly conspiring with others to keep Panagiotou and McCabe from collecting on
the Erkins' Judgment pursuant to the 1998 Assignment Agreement. McCabe acted as counsel for
himself as well as all the other Plaintiffs. Each of the Plaintiffs identified in the Massachusetts
Superior court action were, in reality, collectively McCabe and Panagiotou.
The Massachusetts Superior Court action was dismissed on June 2, 2005, when Judge
van Gestal entered an Order Granting Defendants' eight Motions to Dismiss stating ".. .it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of those claims which would
entitle them to some relief."
The Massachusetts Superior Court action had no merit and the Court did not have
jurisdiction over the parties, and was found to be a frivolous action by United States Bankruptcy
Judge William Hillman who ruled that by failing to file a claim for the $2.6 million deficiency
judgment in the Erkins bankruptcy case, no judgment existed upon which to sue Eliopulos and
the 16 other individuals and entities.

In December 2005, Eliopulos filed an action against Panagiotou and his entities in the
Fourth District Court in Ada County, Idaho. Eliopulos' claims included abuse of process and
tortious interference with a business relationship. The case was assigned to the Honorable
Michael McLaughlin.
On March 16, 2007, McCabe was disbarred from the practice oflaw, based on
investigative findings that McCabe "filed groundless pleadings, in violation of Mass. R. Civ. P.
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11 (a)" in numerous cases, of which at least two cases involved Panagiotou as the plaintiff, and
which McCabe ultimately admitted. McCabe appealed the Court's order of disbarment and the U
.S.Court of Appeals issued an Order of Disbarment on October 21, 2008, and further ordered that
McCabe" be prohibited from holding himself out to be an attorney at law licensed to practice
before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Both the Stoel Rives lawsuit and the Massachusetts Superior Court action were filed for
allegedly keeping Panagiotou and McCabe from collecting on the Erkins' Judgment and both
cases contained the exact same prayer for relief.
Both the Stoel Rives lawsuit and the Massachusetts Superior Court action were
frivolously filed by Panagiotou and McCabe at a tremendous cost to a lot of people, except
Panagiotou and McCabe. Again, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Boston found that Panagiotou
and McCabe had no judgment upon which to sue because of their collective failure to file a claim
in the Erkins bankruptcy case.
Panagiotou admits that he used the Bliss Valley and Devil's Corral properties to secure a
loan to pay the $175,000 to Stoel Rives for settlement of the attorney fees incurred for the
collection on the Erkins Judgment. That loan was assumed by Armand Eckert when he allegedly
purchased the Bliss Valley and Devil's Corral properties in September, 2009.
The 19 Defendants Panagiotou and McCabe named in the Massachusetts Superior Court
action were all forced to pay attorney fees and costs to defend against a the meritless lawsuit
filed by Panagiotou and McCabe. Panagiotou has never paid one dime of the $88,346.39 in
attorney fees and costs to McCabe, The McCabe Group,
During the pendency of the McCabe Adversary case No. 05-01447 filed July 25, 2005,
against Panagiotou for: (i) Judgment declaring and adjudging that the Trustee is a 50% owner
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and shareholder of GEDCO and that GEDCO is the sole member of two related LLC's; (ii) for
willful violation of the automatic stay; (iii) to avoid and recover the unauthorized post petition
transfers by Panagiotou of property of the estate; (iv) for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion
and unjust enrichment; (v) for an accounting; and (vi) for turnover of property of the estate,
numerous Restraining Orders and Injunctions were in place from the time of the filing of this
action until the resolution on April 29, 2009. From July 25, 2005 thru April 29, 2009, Panagiotou
was enjoined from "further secreting, removing, pledging, selling, transferring, conveying,
mortgaging, hypothecating, commingling, dissipating, diluting, encumbering or spending
property of the Estate, including but not limited to the assets of GEDCO, Bliss Valley Properties
LLC and Devil's Corral LLC, as well as McCabe's legal and equitable interest in same and his
derivative interest in the Idaho Properties." Court orders notwithstanding, Panagiotou proceeded
to execute no less than seven quit claim deeds on the two Idaho properties. The deeds
transferred the property from the two llc's to Panagiotou, then to a California company, then
back to Panagiotou. All of the deeds were executed in blatant violation of the injunction, orders
of the court, and the automatic bankruptcy stay.
During the pendency of the McCabe Adversary Case No. 05-12205 filed November 4,
2005, in the U.S. District Court before Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton entered Restraining Orders
and Injunctions against Panagiotou and GEDCO that were in place from April 3, 2006 thru
August 20, 2007, when Judge Gorton remanded the case back to Bankruptcy Court and the
Preliminary Injunction continued until April 29, 2009.
On December 11, 2009, Judge McLaughlin entered a Memorandum Decision on
Defendant Panagiotou (Original) Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court granted Panagiotou
Motion for Summary Judgment in part and ordered Plaintiff Eliopulos to retain licensed counsel
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in order to litigate claims assigned to him by Phoinix Advisors, LLC. All the remaining claims
raised by Panagiotou in his Motion for Summary Judgment were denied.
Alfred J. Bianco died on June 5, 2009. On October 29, 2009, Richard G. Smolev
("Smolev") was appointed successor Plan Administrator of the Gaston & Snow bankruptcy estate
by order of the Court.
Not having the benefit of receiving any notice of Panagiotou's April 29, 2009 Settlement
Agreement with the Trustee Braunstein, Smolev contacted Panagiotou directly and inquired
about the status of the 1998 Assignment Agreement and the transfer of the Bliss Valley and
Devil's Corral properties to GEDCO (Bianco's January 13, 2004 deposition). Again feigning
poverty, Panagiotou successfully led Mr. Smolev to believe that the Erkins Judgment was not
collectable because there was no significant value in the Bliss Valley and Devil's Corral
properties due to the foreclosures and Panagiotou's personal financial status and that the
properties were still tied up in the McCabe Bankruptcy. Panagiotou failed to inform Mr. Smolev
that a Settlement Agreement between himself and Braunstein had been executed on April 29,
2009, wherein paragraph 3(c)(ii) paragraph of the 1998 Assignment Agreement relating to the
attorney fees incurred for collection of money on the Erkins Judgment had been satisfied.
Panagiotou also failed to inform Mr. Smolev that he "sold" the Bliss Valley and Devil's Corral
properties to Armand Eckert dba Magic Manufacturing in September, 2009, for $750,000,
thereby satisfying paragraph 3(c)(i) of the 1998 Assignment Agreement and pocketed the money
instead of paying the $650,000 that was due to Bianco pursuant to the 1998 Assignment
Agreement. On September 30, 2010, Smolev sent a Status Report to the Gaston & Snow
Bankruptcy Court wherein Smolev states in part:
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"The open Collection Matter involves a claim for unpaid legal fees for services rendered
to Robert and Bernadine Erkins, on whose behalf the firm (through Ms. Pittas and Edwin
McCabe, among others) tried a lender liability claim. (the "Erkins claim"). At the end of 1998,
the court approved the sale and assignment of the Erkins claim for $100,000 (the "Cash
Payment") plus a contingent right to receive another $650,000 after repayment of the Cash
payment and reasonable costs of collection. The assignees obtained a multi-million dollar
judgment and commenced collection efforts against real and personal property in Idaho, the
Erkins' home state. Numerous defenses and counterclaims were filed in various states. Mr.
McCabe (at that time representing the assignee of the Erkins Claim) threatened a malpractice suit
against Mr. Bianco and Kaye Scholer based upon an alleged failure to consider the proper statute
of limitations regarding the Erkins Claim. Both the Erkins and Mr. McCabe filed petitions in
bankruptcy, which spawned years of further claim litigation.
Years of appeals followed, in, among other courts, the 2nd and 9th Circuits
(which filed an opinion in one appeal as recently as this summer). From what information is
available in the files, it appears that all property that could be sold to satisfy the Erkins Claim
was sold for amounts insufficient to produce any recovery to the Estate and that the Erkins
received a discharge in bankruptcy. One open question is whether any of the property transfers
were done in a way that intentionally stripped value from the Estate. The Administration
Committee has authorized the Successor Plan Administrator to retain Frederic D. Grant, Jr. of
Boston, MA as special counsel to investigate these claims ... (emphasis added).

It is clear from the language set forth in the October 1, 2009, Status Report to the
Gaston & Snow Bankruptcy Court, that Smolev had no knowledge of the April 29, 2009
Settlement Agreement between Panagiotou and Braunstein satisfying paragraph 3(c)(ii) of the
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I 998 Assignment Agreement, or the sale of the Bliss Valley and Devil's Corral properties to
Armand Eckert dba Magic Manufacturing, Inc. in September, 2009 for $750,000, putting Bianco
in line for payment of his $650,000 due to him pursuant to the 1998 Assignment Agreement.
Additionally, Smolev's actions in assigning Bianco's interest in the 1998 Assignment Agreement
to Eliopulos on behalf of Meglon Trust in exchange for dismissal of the Erkins claims against the
Gaston & Snow estate, instead of collecting the $650,000 immediately from Panagiotou for the
Gaston & Snow bankruptcy estate before closing the estate indicate that Smolev had no
knowledge of the April 29, 2009 Settlement Agreement between Panagiotou and Braunstein or
that Panagiotou sold the Bliss Valley and Devil's Corral properties to Armand Eckert in
September, 2009 for $750,000.
In February, 2010, Eliopulos in his capacity as Trustee of the Meglon Trust, purchased
the 1998 Bianco contract with Panagiotou. Eliopulos informed Panagiotou's attorney, Allen
Ellis, of the purchase of the Bianco contract and requested an accounting of the assets and
collection efforts related thereto. Eliopulos was informed at that time that Panagiotou had sold

all of his interests in the two Idaho properties in 2009. Eliopulos requested copies of the sale
documents, but Panagiotou and his counsel refused to produce them.
Eliopulos was gravely concerned when learning that Panagiotou had sold all of his
interests in the two Idaho properties White Arrow Ranch and Devils Corral. The sale of the
properties created a serious breach of the contract. Eliopulos took immediate steps to retain
counsel to file a breach of contract claim against Panagiotou and his entities.
On April 6, 2010, Judge McLaughlin denied Panagiotou's (Renewed) Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court's December 11, 2009 ruling denying Panagiotou's (Original)
Motion for Summary Judgment.
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On May 16, 2010, Brady Law, Chartered, filed a Notice of Appearance on behalf of
Eliopulos, filed an amended complaint which included a breach of contract claim on the Bianco
contract for Panagiotou's sale of all of his interest in the two Idaho properties, and a Motion to
Vacate the Trial Setting based on insufficient time to prepare for the June 7, 2010 scheduled trial
date. On October 5, 2010, the Court rescheduled the trial to commence on April 1, 2011. Three
days later, on October 8, 20 I 0, Defendants' filed a Motion for Change of Venue to Gooding
County "allegedly" because that was where Panagiotou resided. No other rationale for the
Motion to Change Venue was given. All the other parties, and even Panagiotou's counsel, are
located in Boise. After nearly 5 years oflitigating this case in front of Judge McLaughlin, a
Judge who was well versed in the facts of this case, with Panagiotou residing in Gooding, Idaho,
Panagiotou, for no good reason other than to get this case in front of another Court, moved to
change venue. On November 5, 2010, the Court granted Defendants' Motion for Change of
Venue and an Order for Change of Venue was entered on December 1, 2010.
The case was moved to Gooding County, Idaho. The judge assigned to the case was the
Honorable John Butler. Immediately upon the transfer of the case, Panagiotou and his attorney
Allen Ellis again moved for summary judgment on the identical issues twice denied by Judge
McLaughlin in Ada County notwithstanding Rule 1 l(a)(2)(A) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule l l(a)(2)(A) states in part:
SuccessiveApplications. In any action, if an application by any party to the judge of a court for
the issuance of an order or writ is denied in whole or in part by such judge, neither the party nor
the party's attorney shall make any subsequent application to any other judge except by appeal
to a higher court; provided that a second application may be made for a constitutional writ after
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a disclosure of the first application has been made to the second judge. Any writ or order
obtained in violation of this section shall be immediately vacated by the judge issuing the same
upon discovery of the prior application to another judge, and the party and the attorney shall be
subject to such costs and sanctions as the court may determine in its discretion. Nothing in this
rule shall prevent a party or the attorney from renewing a motion or application to the same
judge or a newly appointed judge, in an action after such motion or application was originally
denied ; but this provision and this rule shall not create the right to file a motion for
reconsideration except as provided in subsection (B) of this rule. Nothing in this rule shall
prevent a party or an attorney from renewing a motion or an application for a constitutional writ
to the same judge, or a newly appointed judge, in an action after such motion or application was
originally denied.
In basic terms, you get two shots on the same issue(s). The Court's ruling on your original
motion and the Court's ruling on your renewal or "reconsideration" motion.
Not only did Panagiotou deliberately and intentionally orchestrate a change of venue to
get the very same issues on Summary Judgment before the Gooding Court that Judge
McLaughlin twice denied, Panagiotou failed to provide any new evidence or proof that his
(Third) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment had any merit whatsoever.

InMcAttee v. Faulkner Land & Livestock, Inc. 113 Idaho 393; 744 P.2d 121 (1987), the
Idaho court of appeals stated in part:

LR.C.P l l(a)(2)(A} In any action, if an application by any party to the judge of a court
for the issuance of an order or writ is denied in whole or in part by such judge, neither the party
or his attorney shall make any subsequent application to any other judge except by appeal to a
higher court ... Any writ or order obtained in violation of this section shall be immediately
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vacated by the judge issuing the same upon discovery of the prior application to another judge,
and the party and his attorney shall be subject to such costs and sanctions as the court may
determine in its discretion. Nothing in this rule shall prevent a party or his attorney from
renewing a motion or an application to the same judge, or a newly appointed judge, in an action
after such motion or application was originally denied ... [Emphasis added]
The rule condemns any effort to nullify a judge's order by bringing a second judge into
the case and obtaining a contrary order from him.
During the pendency of the prior case, Panagiotou and his counsel continually failed to
comply with the discovery rules set forth in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Twelve Notices
of Deposition Duces Tecum for Defendant George Panagiotou were served since the
commencement of this case in December 2005. It was only after Eliopulos was ready to file a
Fifth Motion for Order Compelling Panagiotou's appearance for examination that Mr.
Panagiotou finally appeared for his deposition on March 16, 2010. Panagiotou brought no
documents to the deposition; he refused to answer Eliopulos' questions; and Panagiotou and his
counsel did little more than argue with Eliopulos for three hours. Eliopulos finally terminated the
deposition until he could obtain an Order from the Court relating to the scope of questioning and
Panagiotou's refusal to respond.
During the pendency of the case before Judge McLaughlin, Eliopulos was forced to file 9
motions to compel discovery from Panagiotou, all of which were granted. No documents were
ever produced notwithstanding the Court's orders to do so. At the time the case was transferred
from Ada County to Gooding County, Panagiotou had not produced any documents that
responded to Eliopulos' four pending discovery requests.
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In addition to the McCabe and Erkins bankruptcy stays and the Injunctions and
Restraining Orders against Panagiotou, GEDCO, Bliss Valley, and Devil's Corral properties,
and the fact that conditions precedent pursuant to the 1998 Assignment Agreement had not yet
been satisfied and Bianco's claim for breach of contract was not yet ripe, an even more
compelling reason that Bianco did not pursue legal action against Panagiotou to enforce the
terms of the 1998 Assignment Agreement, was that Bianco had no idea that the April 29, 2009
Settlement Agreement even existed. Bianco was never given notice of Braunstein's Motion to
Approve the Settlement Agreement with Panagiotou; the Notice of Hearing on Braunstein's
Motion to Approve Settlement Agreement Resolving Collection of a Judgment Against George
Panagiotou and Gedco, LLC, and Allocation of the proceeds Thereof; or the April 29, 2009
Order Allowing Motion by Braunstein, to Approve Settlement Agreement Resolving Collection
of a Judgment Against Panagiotou and GEDCO, LLC, and Allocation of the Proceeds Thereof.
Appellant has set forth in the Factual Statement herein, the course of the previous action
which has given rise to the action presently before the Court. As set forth in the factual
statement, the breach of contract action was filed and based on the representation of Panagiotou
and his counsel Mr. Ellis that Panagiotou had sold all of his interests in the two Idaho properties
in 2009. From the time of filing of the breach of contract action, Panagiotou and his attorney
Ellis represented that Panagiotou had sold all of his interests in the two Idaho properties to the
courts of Judges McLaughlin and Butler. The representations were made in pleadings, oral
arguments, affidavits and deposition testimony.
Judge Butler, in November 2011, granted summary judgment on the breach of contract
claim finding that the claim was time barred under the statute of limitations. In his ruling the
Judge found that Panagiotou had actually breached the contract in 2004, that the bankruptcy stay
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had no effect on the statute of limitations, and that since Panagiotou had sold all of his interests
in the properties, no claim remained. No attorney fees were awarded.
Based on the representations that Panagiotou had sold all his interests in the properties,
the Trust elected not to appeal the summary judgment decision.
In June 2012, Eliopulos purchased the Bianco contract from the Meglon Trust. The
purchase included any and all rights that in any way related to the Bianco contract.
On June 27, 2012, Panagiotou sued Eliopulos in the Fourth District Court in Ada County
for abuse of process and defamation of title relating to the previous case before Judges
McLaughlin and Butler. Eliopulos counterclaimed against Panagiotou and the case was assigned
to the Honorable Lynn G. Norton.
In or about July 2012, Eliopulos received a copy of a real estate advertisement for the
sale of White Arrow Ranch. The advertisement listed George Panagiotou as the owner of the
White Arrow Ranch. In September 2012, Eliopulos confirmed from the public record that
Panagiotou did indeed have an ownership interest in the two Idaho properties.
In July 2012, Eliopulos was informed, for the first time, that Panagiotou and his three
entities Bliss Valley Properties LLC, Devils Corral LLC and GEDCO LLC, were formed by the
law firm of Benoit Alexander Harwood High & Butler LLP. The entities owned by Panagiotou,
which as stated herein were defendants in the previous Ada County action, and were deemed to
be fraudulent enterprises formed for the purpose of defrauding creditors in the McCabe
bankruptcy proceeding by a federal bankruptcy judge, were clients of the Twin Falls, Idaho law
firm of Benoit Alexander Harwood High & Butler, LLP. The Benoit firm had formed and
represented Bliss Valley Properties, LLC and Devils Corral, LLC, both of which were owned by
Panagiotou and the Delaware limited liability company GEDCO, LLC. Benoit Alexander also
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represented Panagiotou. Records show that the Benoit firm represented Panagiotou and the three
LLC's from 2001 through at least December of 2006. What Eliopulos discovered after the
conclusion of the case, was that Judge Butler, the sitting judge in the Gooding County case, was
a partner in the Benoit Alexander Harwood High & Butler firm during the period 2001 to
December 2006.
Eliopulos' review of documents obtained from the public record in 2012, identified
correspondence between Mr. Ellis and the Benoit firm during the period 2003 to 2006 regarding
Panagiotou and the bankruptcy case in Boston, the litigation filed against the three llc's in Boston
and Idaho. Other documents obtained by Eliopulos in 2012 indicate that there were
communications between the Boston bankruptcy Trustee Joseph Braunstein and the Benoit firm
regarding a contempt order issued against Panagiotou as it related to quit claim deeds prepared
by the Benoit firm, and claims against Panagiotou and the Idaho llc's for violations of the
automatic bankruptcy stay.
At no time, ever, did counsel Ellis, or his client Panagiotou, identify the relationship of
Panagiotou and his entities with the Benoit firm that, at the very least, raised the prospect of a
potential conflict of interest. This issue is most troubling for numerous reasons.
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II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 27, 2012, Panagiotou filed suit against Eliopulos in the Fourth District Court for
Ada County, Idaho. (R. 15). The causes of action were malicious prosecution, abuse of process
and slander of title.
After a series of recusals, the Honorable Lynn G. Norton was assigned to the case.
On August 8, 2012, Eliopulos filed a Motion for More Definite Statement.
On November 6, 2012, Appellant Eliopulos filed his Answer, Affirmative Defenses and
Counterclaim. (R. 26). The counterclaim set forth the claims of fraud, fraudulent concealment,
litigation fraud and intentional misrepresentation.
On November 13, 2012, Panagiotou filed a Reply to the Counterclaim. (R. 46).
On November 13, 2012, Panagiotou filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
On November 14, 2012, Eliopulos filed his Motion for Leave to Amend Counterclaim.
On November 28, 2012, an Order Granting Leave to Amend Answer and Counterclaim
was entered by the Court.
On December 13, 2012, Eliopulos filed his Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings.
On January 2, 2013, the Court denied the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by
Panagiotou.
On January 24, 2013, Eliopulos filed a Motion to Compel Discovery Responses and a
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel.
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On January 30, 2013, Eliopulos filed an Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses and
Verified Counterclaim (R. 50). The Amended Verified Counterclaim set forth the following
causes of action fraud, fraudulent concealment, litigation fraud, intentional misrepresentation and
fraud on the court.
On January 30, 2013, Eliopulos filed a Motion to Dismiss, an affidavit of Petros G.
Eliopulos in Support of the Motion to Dismiss and a Memorandum In Support of Motion to
Dismiss.
On February 20, 2013, Panagiotou filed a Motion for a Protective Order Respecting
Certain Discovery.
On March 4, 2013, Eliopulos filed a Second Motion to Compel with a Certificate of
Compliance Pursuant to Rule 37(a).
On March 14, 2013, Eliopulos filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss.
On March 4, 2013, Judge Norton entered a Memorandum Decision and Order Denying
Eliopulos' Motion to Dismiss and Notice oflntent to Dismiss as to Meglon Domestic NonGrantor Trust. (R. 72).
On April 23, 2013, the Court entered a Dismissal as to Meglon Domestic Non-Grantor
Trust. (R. 85).
On May 22, 2013, Eliopulos filed a Motion to Compel Discovery and for Sanctions and a
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Discovery and for Sanctions.
On May 30, 2013, Panagiotou filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Compel
Discovery supported by the Seventh Affidavit of Allen B. Ellis and the Affidavit of George
Panagiotou.
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On August 29, 2013, Panagiotou filed a Motion for Protective Order.
On September 12, 2013, the Court entered an Order Granting Eliopulos' Motion for
Sanctions. (R. 87) and (R. 289).
On September 26, 2013, Eliopulos filed a Second Motion for Sanctions Re: Wilful
Violation of the Court's Order Dated September 12, 2013. (R. 91).
On September 26, 2013, Eliopulos filed the Affidavit of Petros G. Eliopulos in Support of
Second Motion for Sanctions Re: Willful Violation of the Court's Order Dated September 12,
2013. (R. 93). The Affidavit included Exhibits A (R. 97-99), and B (R. 100). Exhibit Bis of
prime importance in the case.
On September 26, 2013 Eliopulos filed a Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for
Sanctions Re: Willful Violation of the Court's Order Dated September 12, 2013. (R. 101).
On October 9, 2013, Panagiotou filed the Second Affidavit of George Panagiotou.
On October 9, 2013, Panagiotou filed the Third Affidavit of George Panagiotou.
On October 11, 2013, Eliopulos filed his Eliopulos' Reply Memorandum in Support of
Second Motion for Sanctions Re: Willful Violation of the Court's Order Dated September 12,
2013.
On November 20, 2013, the Court entered an Order Granting the Defendants Second
Motion for Sanctions. (R. 107).
On November 20, 2013, the Court entered its Production of Document. (R. 120).
On November 20, 2013, the Court entered an Order of Contempt against Panagiotou. (R.
123).
On January 23, 2014, Eliopulos filed Eliopulos' Third Motion to Compel and for
Sanctions. (R. 126).
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On January 23, 2014, Eliopulos filed Eliopulos' Memorandum in Support of Third
Motion to Compel and for Sanctions. (R. 127).
On January 30, 2014, Panagiotou filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R.

259).
On February 4, 2014, Eliopulos filed his Reply Memorandum in Support of Third Motion
to Compel and For Sanctions. (R. 277).
On February 5, 2014, Eliopulos filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Pleadings Related Thereto. (R. 283).
On February 6, 2014, Eliopulos filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike. (R.

285).
On February 7, 2014, the Court entered its Order Granting Eliopulos' Filing of January
23, 2014 Titled Third Motion to Compel and for Sanctions. (R. 308).
On February 7, 2014, a Judgment was entered in favor of Eliopulos and against
Panagiotou dismissing Panagiotou's action against Eliopulos with prejudice. (R. 317).
On February 7, 2014, the Court entered a Civil Disposition for: Eliopulos, Petros
Defendant; Panagiotou, George, Plaintiff. Filing Date: 2/7/14.
On February 7, 2014, Eliopulos filed a Motion Pursuant to Rule 56(f) IRCP and an
Affidavit of Petros G. Eliopulos in Support of Motion.
On February 20, 2014, Eliopulos filed Eliopulos' Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R. 319).
On February 20, 2014, Eliopulos filed the Affidavit of Petros G. Eliopulos in Opposition
to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R. 335).
On February 20, 2014, Panagiotou filed a Motion to Transfer.
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On February 27, 2014, Eliopulos filed Eliopulos' Opposition to Motion to Transfer
On March 7, 2014, the Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order Granting
Summary Judgment on Counterclaims. R. (R. 377); a Final Judgment (R. 386); and a Civil
Disposition entered for: Eliopulos, Petros, Defendant: Panagiotou, George, Plaintiff. Filing Date
3/7/14.
On March 20, 2014, Eliopulos filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification
and/or Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order. (R. 388).
On April 3, 2014, Eliopulos filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration and Clarification and/or Relief From Judgment or Order. (R. 390).
On May 20, 2014, Eliopulos filed an Affidavit of Petros G. Eliopulos In Support of
Motion for Reconsideration And Clarification and/or Relief From Judgment Or Order. (R. 439).
On May 20, 2014, Eliopulos filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration and Clarification and/or Relief From Judgment or Order. (R. 443).
On June 13, 2014, the Court entered an Order Denying Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration or Relief from Judgment, and Denying Plaintiff's Motions for Sanctions and
Relief. (R. 457).

III.
ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Did the Court err in granting summary judgment on Eliopulos' personal and

individual claims?
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2.

Did the Court err in granting summary judgment on Eliopulos' counterclaims

pursuant to a contract purchased for good and valuable consideration?
3.

Did the Court err in implementing the granting of sanctions for willful violation

of the Court's order?

IV.
STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW
In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the Court's standard of review
isthe same as the standard used by the district court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.

Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200,205, 61 P.3d 557, 562 (2002). All
disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non- moving party.

Oats v. Nissan Motor C01p. in U.S.A., 126 Idaho 162, 164, 879 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1994).
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The Court exercises
free review over questions of law. Rhodes v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 132,233 P.3d 61, 63 (2010).
The Court must "liberally construe ... the record in favor of the party opposing the
motion and draw ... all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor." Steele, 138
Idaho at 251, 61 P.3d at 608. Summary judgment is not appropriate "[i]fthe evidence is
conflicting on material issues, or if reasonable minds could reach different conclusions."
Peterson v. Romine, 131 Idaho 537, 540, 960 P.2d 1266, 1269 (1998). Liberty Northwest Ins.
Co. v. Spudnik Equip. Co., LLC, 155 Idaho 730, 732-33, 316 P.3d 646, 648-49 (2013).
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Additionally, when the district court grants summary judgment and then denies a motion for
reconsideration, 'this Court must determine whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of
material fact to defeat summary judgment. The Court reviews the district court's denial of a
motion for reconsideration de novo." Bremer, LLC v.

Greenacres Irrigation Dist., 155 Idaho

736, 744, 316 P.3d 652, 660 (2013) (quoting Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281
P.3d 103, 113 (2012).
Generally, the nonmoving party in a motion for summary judgment need only respond to
those issues raised by the moving party in its opening memorandum. Thomson v. Idaho Ins.
Agency, 126 Idaho 527, 530-31, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994) (holding that a nonmoving
party need only raise a genuine issue of material fact on the issues raised in the opening
memorandum in support of summary judgment and not on every issue, even if not argued).
"Circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of material fact." ParkWest Homes, LLC, v.
Barnson, 154 Udagi 678,682,302 P.3d 18, 22 (2013).
The standard of review for an appellate court reviewing a trial court's imposition of
sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11 is one of abuse of discretion. Slack v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 38,
39, 89 P.3d 878,879 (2004) (citing Chapple v. Madison County Officials, 132 Idaho 76, 967 P.2d
278 (1998); Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 803 P.2d 993
(1991)). In reviewing whether or not a trial court abused its discretion, this Court analyzes: 1)
whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) whether the trial court
acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the applicable legal standards;
and (3) whether the trial court reached its determination through an exercise of reason.
Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 857,920 P.2d 67, 73 (1996). The Court
has free review over a trial court's conclusions oflaw. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C.,
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140 Idaho 354, 364, 93 P.3d 685, 695 (2004) (citing Trimble v. Engelking, 134 Idaho 195, 196,
998 P.2d 502, 503 (2000).
As for motions to reconsider, this Court recently clarified that the standard of review was
"the same standard of review used by the lower court in deciding the motion for
reconsideration." When the district court grants summary judgment and then denies a motion for
reconsideration, the Court must determine whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of
material fact to defeat summary judgment. The Court reviews the district court's denial of a
motion for reconsideration de novo. Bremer, LLC, v. E. Greenacres Irrigation Dist. 155 Idaho
736, 744, 316 P.3d 652, 660 (2013).

V.
ARGUMENT

A. The Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment on Eliopulos' Personal
Claims.
From 2005 to 2010, the causes of action before the Court of Judge McLaughlin were as
follows: Abuse of Process, Tortious Interference, Injunctive Relief, Litigation Fraud in
Panagiotou and McCabe's acquisition of the judgment in the New York Bankruptcy Court and
claims of the Estate Eliopulos personally purchased from the Bankruptcy Trustee against
Panagiotou. After Eliopulos acquired the Bianco contract as Trustee for the Meglon Trust in
2010, causes of action for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing were added. For purposes of this argument the claims for abuse of process,
tortious interference, injunctive relief and litigation fraud will be referred to as Eliopulos'
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personal claims, and the claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing will be referred to as the Meglon Trust's claims.
The Boston Litigation was ultimately ruled to have been frivolously filed, without merit,
and was dismissed. The Boston Litigation set forth claims against Eliopulos, individually, and
16 other individuals and entities for allegedly conspiring to prevent Panagiotou and McCabe
from selling White Arrow Ranch and Devils Corral, the two Idaho properties. After the ruling
from the Boston Bankruptcy Court, Eliopulos filed the action in Ada County in 2005.
As referenced in the Statement of Facts, Eliopulos attempted, for a period of five years, to
obtain documents and testimony to substantiate his personal claims. He was forced to file 9
motions to compel relating to four discovery requests to which Panagiotou responded that "no
documents existed" or "the documents are with my Boston attorney and are privileged."
After the filing of the Fifth Amended Complaint, it was determined, not having
documents to support the personal claims, that the claims would be voluntarily withdrawn. The
decision was based on the representations by Panagiotou to the Courts of Judges McLaughlin
and Butler that no documents existed relating to the Massachusetts Superior Court action.
Accordingly, the only claims set forth in the Sixth Amended Complaint before Judge Butler were
the claims of the Meglon Trust for breach contract and breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, and the claim Eliopulos had purchased from the Bankruptcy Trustee
relating to legal fees owed by Panagiotou to McCabe.
The personal claims in the Verified Counterclaim in the case before Judge Norton are
Fraud, Fraudulent Concealment, Litigation Fraud, Intentional Misrepresentation and Fraud on
the Court. A review of each of the causes of action as pied in the Verified Counterclaim
identifies acts relating solely to the "Ada County Court", "a fraudulent plan and scheme to delay
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the Ada County litigation by the filing of false pleadings and false affidavits" and "Panagiotou
intentionally misrepresented that no documents existed relative to the discovery requests of the
Plaintiff, fraudulently represented that all documents were privileged". All of the claims
regarding the Ada County litigation and concealment of documents related to the personal claims
of Eliopulos and were separate and distinct from the claims regarding the Bianco contract.
To prove Eliopulos' cause of action for abuse of process in the prior case, it was
necessary to provide evidence that the Massachusetts Superior Court action was filed for an
improper purpose. Eliopulos sought documents from Panagiotou in discovery, but as set forth
herein, no documents were ever produced. It wasn't until Eliopulos obtained documents from
Boston in January 2014, that Eliopulos finally obtained the evidence relating to the abuse of
process action. This is more particularly set forth in Judge Norton's Order Granting Eliopulos
Motion to Compel and for Sanctions on February 7, 2014. (R. 308). The Court stated as
follows:
"The Defendant by other means procured, communications and correspondence that are
relevant to this proceeding and would have been responsive to Requests for Production 10, 11
and 12. From the Court's review of the requests for production attached as Exhibit E of the
current motion, this Court finds these communications are responsive and were not either
produced or disclosed on a privilege log as required by this court's previous orders."

In Judge Norton's Memorandum Decision Granting Summary Judgment and in the
Memorandum Denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the Court found that the operative
complaint in the Gooding Court was the Sixth Amended Complaint. The Sixth Amended
Complaint basically set forth three causes of action. The actions for breach of contract, breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the claim Eliopulos purchased from the
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Bankruptcy Trustee. Eliopulos' personal claims, as previously stated, had been voluntarily
withdrawn.
The Plaintiff Panagiotou moved for partial summary judgment, which related only to the
Bianco contract. As it related to the motion, the Court indicated that it was only going to address
the issue of standing.
In its decision, the Court erred in failing to address Eliopulos' personal claims. Because
of Panagiotou's intentional misrepresentations, concealment and fraud regarding discovery,
Eliopulos voluntarily withdrew his personal claims. It wasn't until June 2012, well after the
conclusion of the case before Judge Butler, that Eliopulos first received information that
confirmed Panagiotou had intentionally concealed documents relating to the Massachusetts
Superior Court action, which had been ordered produced by Judge McLaughlin. The documents
were obtained from the Board of Bar Overseers in Boston, Massachusetts, who had received
them from Panagiotou's former counsel in response to an investigation, inquiry and complaint
relating to his representation of Panagiotou in the Boston Bankruptcy proceedings. It was at that
point, the date the fraud was discovered, that the claim arose. The Plaintiff fraudulently
represented that all documents were privileged, filed 3 false affidavits with the Court and made
false statements to the Court. Eliopulos had no way to reasonably discover the fraud, until June
2012 at the earliest.
A cursory review of the Verified Counterclaim confirms that Eliopulos' causes of action
included his personal claims. As it relates to the First Cause of Action: Fraud, Eliopulos pled as
follows:
"Because Panagiotou intentionally concealed the documents, Panagiotou conspired to
engage in a fraudulent plan and scheme to delay the Ada CountyJitigationby the filing of false
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pleadings and false affidavits. Panagiotou intentionally misrepresented that no documents
existed." The Court erred in granting summary judgment on Eliopulos' personal claims in the
Verified Counterclaim.

B. The Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment on the Issue of Standing.
The exact same scenario relates to the Bianco contract. Eliopulos purchased the contract,
which included any and all rights, known or unknown, relating thereto, in June 2012.
Panagiotou, and his counsel, from the period 2010 to November 2011, made the following false
statements to the Court for the sole purpose of obtaining a judicial decision in his favor in the
case before Judge Butler:
1.

That Panagiotou had sold both Idaho properties, White Arrow Ranch and Devils

Corral to Armand Eckert;
2.

That Panagiotou had retained no interest in the Idaho properties, White Arrow

Ranch and Devils Corral.

It was based on these fraudulent statements that Judge Butler granted summary judgment,
finding that the statute oflimitations had run on the breach of contract claim. The irony of the
case at that point is that had the fraudulent representations regarding the alleged sale of the two
Idaho properties not been made, no breach of contract claim would have been made, because
pursuant to the Bianco contract, as long as Panagiotou held an interest in the properties the
contract was in full force and effect
Eliopulos first discovered some evidence in June 2012, the real estate advertisement
mentioned hereinabove, and later confirmed by documents obtained in the public record in
September 2012, that the representations made in the Gooding case were intentionally false. It
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was at that point, that the fraud claims relating to the Bianco contract arose. Just as with
Eliopulos' personal claims, because Panagiotou intentionally concealed the documents, filed
false affidavits with the Court and made false statements to the Court, Eliopulos had no way to
reasonably discover the fraud on the Bianco contract until June 2012 at the earliest. Because of
the discovery that Panagiotou still retains an interest in the properties in September of 2013, the
Bianco contract may be still in full force and effect.
It was during the pendency of the case before Judge Norton that the undisputed evidence

was finally produced, which confirms that the pleadings, testimony and affidavits of Panagiotou
and Eckert upon which Judge Butler ruled, were intentionally false.
Judge Butler's decision was also based on the deposition testimony of Armand Eckert,

under oath, that he had purchased both properties in April 2009, that Panagiotou had retained no
interest in the Idaho properties, that there was no side agreement between him and Panagiotou
regarding any further ownership of the properties by Panagiotou, and that his purchase of the
property was not a sham transaction.
In Eckert's deposition (R. 354) taken on August 18, 2011 in the underlying case, Eckert
responded to questions posed by Eliopulos' counsel Michael Brady:
MR. BRADY: And we have a right to pursue whether or not this is a sham transaction to
avoid paying on that assignment.

A. (by Mr. Eckert) Well, I guess that I'd object to the fact that you're alleging that this is
a sham transaction. This is a very valid transaction. I own the property and I'll do damn well
what I want to with it. (page 32 of the August 18, 2011 deposition transcript) (R. 364).
MR. BRADY: Has there been any side agreement between any of the entities which are
listed as borrowers on Exhibit 30, George Panagiotou, Bliss Valley, Devils Corral or Gedco,
LLC, that any of those individuals or entities will share in any of the proceeds of the sale of any
lots?
A. (by Mr. Eckert) There are no side agreements. (page 34 of the August 18, 2011
deposition transcript) (R. 364).
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Q. (BY MR. BRADY) Mr. Eckert, I have one final question for you.
Do you personally, or Magic Manufacturing, have any ongoing relationship with Mr.
Panagitou or any entity that he controls with regard to the development of either the White
Arrow, Bliss Valley, or Devils Corral properties?
THE WITNESS: I only use Mr. Panagiotou on an advisory capacity, consult with him
from time to time. He lives on the property. Sometimes I ask him to do things out of
convenience for the purpose of residing there. But I have no other business relationship there.
(page 46 of the August 18, 2011 deposition transcript) (R. 367).

It should be noted that throughout the deposition, Panagiotou's counsel continually
instructed the deponent (whom he did not represent) not to answer questions posed by Mr. Brady.
The instruction was based on a proposed order of Judge Butler regarding a discovery request.
The proposed order was ultimately rejected by Judge Butler. It is clear that Armand Eckert and
George Panagiotou, with the assistance of counsel, coordinated the testimony of Eckert to be
consistent with the pleadings, affidavits and representations of counsel in the underlying case
regarding the alleged sale of the Idaho properties to Eckert in 2009. The referenced pleadings,
affidavits and representations of counsel were false. Eckert's sworn testimony was also false.
Panagiotou's fraudulent statements and pleadings, and Eckert's perjured testimony constitute a
fraud on the Courts of Judges McLaughlin and Butler.
In documents ordered produced in this case, Panagiotou produced an email dated
February 8, 2010 from Panagiotou to attorney Allen Ellis. In the email, Panagiotou informed
attorney Ellis of the "real" agreement between Panagiotou and Armand Eckert. That email (R.
369) and attached agreement (R. 370) clearly sets out that Panagiotou had retained at least an
85% ownership in White Arrow and a 100% ownership interest in Devils Corral. The agreement
is signed by Armand Eckert. The date of the email, February 8, 2010 predates all representations
by Panagiotou and his counsel to the courts of Judges McLaughlin and Butler that Panagiotou
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had sold the two Idaho properties to Armand Eckert and retained no further interest in them. The
fraudulent conduct of Panagiotou should shock the conscious of this Court.
In three different orders of Judge Norton's Court, Panagiotou was to produce all
documents in his possession and control that related White Arrow Ranch, Devils Corral, Bliss
Valley Properties, LLC and Devils Corral, LLC. Panagiotou failed to comply with those orders.
He cited the fact that he was waiting to provide the documents until after an auction on White
Arrow Ranch was complete. Panagiotou's failure to comply the Court's orders then led to an
Order of Contempt.
Once the documents were finally produced, yet another agreement between Panagiotou
and Eckert was discovered entitled "Agreement Between and Among George Panagiotou &
Related Entities and Armand Eckert & Related Entities". (R. 371).
In paragraph no. 6 of the agreement, it states in pertinent part, "that Armand Eckert &
Magic Manufacturing, Inc. will be further indemnified by George Panagiotou and Bliss Valley
Properties LLC from any legal action arising from the unsecured creditors if not paid from the
proceeds of the sale and from any pending litigation pertaining to George Panagiotou and Petros

Eliopulos (Exhibit A)".
In paragraph no. 8 of the agreement, the ownership interests of Panagiotou and Eckert in
Devils Corral is stated as 10% for Eckert and 90% for Panagiotou. The agreement also sets out
an alleged loan agreement whereby by Panagiotou receives ~JI of the cash from the alleged sale
of White Arrow Ranch in September 2013. All of this is directly contrary to the sworn testimony
of Eckert in his deposition.

It is clear that the sworn statements and testimony of Panagiotou and Eckert regarding
Eckert's alleged purchase of both Idaho properties in 2009 were intentionally false. Eckert and
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Magic Manufacturing were participants in the fraud perpetrated on the courts of Judges
McLaughlin and Butler. They were also participants in the fraud perpetrated on the Court and
creditors in the United States Bankruptcy Court in Massachusetts. Eckert has asked for
indemnification from Panagiotou from Eliopulos' claims against Panagiotou. Accordingly, he
has, since at least 2008, been fully aware of the litigation between Eliopulos and Panagiotou. So
much aware in fact, that he has sought indemnification relating to them. Contrary to the perjured
testimony of Armand Eckert and Panagiotou, it is undisputed that the alleged sale of the Idaho
properties in 2009 was indeed a sham transaction.
The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the
party wishes to have adjudicated. Valley Forge College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 102
S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). While the doctrine is easily stated, it is imprecise and difficult
in its application. (]'Hair v. White, 675 F.2d 680 (Former 5th Cir.1982). However, the major
aspect of standing has been explained:
"The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking to invoke the court's
jurisdiction has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the
concrete adversariness which sharpens the presentation upon which the court so depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions." As refined by subsequent reformation, this
requirement of "personal stake" has come to be understood to require not only a "distinct
palpable injury" to the plaintiff, but also a "fairly traceable" causal connection between the
claimed injury and the challenged conduct. (Citations omitted.)

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Erzv. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2630, 57
L.Ed.2d 595 (1978). The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the
issues the party wishes to have adjudicated. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d
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757 (1989). Although the doctrine is imprecise and difficult in its application, in Miles this Court
adopted a criterion which explained:
"[t]he essence of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking to invoke the court's
jurisdiction has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the
concrete adversariness which sharpens the presentation upon which the court so depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions." As refined by subsequent reformation, this
requirement of "personal stake" has come to be understood to require not only a "distinct
palpable injury" to the plaintiff~ but also a "fairly traceable" causal connection between the
claimed injury and the challenged conduct. Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763 (quoting
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57

L.Ed.2d 595 (1978)) ( citations omitted).
Thus, to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, litigants generally must
allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief
requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury. Id. at 79, 98 S.Ct. at 2633. Standing may be
predicated upon a threatened harm as well as a past injury. Harris v. Cassia Cnty, 106 Idaho at
516, 681 P.2d at 991 (1984).
In this case, the Comt erred in determining that the injury relating to Eliopulos's fraud
claims, as they relate lo the Bianco contract, were claims of the Mcglon Trust. The Court further
erred in ruling that Eliopulos had no standing to pursue the claims in his individual capacity.
On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must "liberally construe ... the record in favor of
the party opposing the motion and draw .. all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that
party's favor." Steele v. Spokesman-Review, 138 Idaho at 251, 61 P.3d at 608. Summary
judgment is not appropriate "[i ]f the evidence is conflicting on material issues, or if reasonable
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minds could reach different conclusions." Peterson v. Romine, 131 Idaho 537, 540, 960 P.2d
1266, 1269 (1998).
The following facts and record that should have been liberally construed in Eliopulos'
favor by the Court were the following:
1.

That Eliopulos purchased the Bianco contract, and any and all rights thereto, in

June of 2012;
2.

That Eliopulos' purchase of the Bianco contract pre-dated the discovery of any

evidence which would have given rise to the fraud claims;
3.

That no claim of fraud in the Bianco contract had ever been made;

4.

That any injury relating to the fraud occurred after Eliopulos' purchase of the

Bianco contract.
In its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Summary Judgment On Counterclaims,
the Court erroneously states "Nothing in the 2010 and 1998 Assignments assigns the rights of
Meglon Trust against Panagiotou for any fraud which may have allegedly occurred during the
2005 Ada County case. Thus, even considering Mr. Eliopulos' affidavit stating Meglon Trust
assigned its rights in "the Bianco contract" to Eliopulos in his individual capacity in April 2012
in a light most favorable to Mr. Eliopulos, those rights did not and do not include any rights of
Meglon Trust against Panagiotou for any fraud which may have allegedly occurred during the
2005 Ada County case." The lower court's finding that the fraud claim relating to the Bianco
contract arose before Eliopulos' purchase is erroneous. There is nothing in the record to support
such a finding. Further, there is nothing in the record to support that Eliopulos purchase of the
Bianco contract did not include any claims for fraud. Construing the facts in the light most
favorable to Eliopulos on the issue, would have resulted in the finding that Eliopulos' purchase
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of the Bianco contract did in fact include any and all claims, known or unknown, relating to the
contract. There is no evidence to the contrary.
All of these facts were set out in Eliopulos' Verified Counterclaim, which stands as an
affidavit as to all factual statements contained therein, and Eliopulos' Affidavit in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Had the Court "liberally construed" all
reasonably inferences in Eliopulos' favor, the Court would have rendered a finding that
Eliopulos had standing to prosecute the fraud claims relating to the Bianco contract as set forth in
the Verified Counterclaim. The Court's failure to correctly apply the facts on the issue is clear
reversible err.

C. The Court Erred in Failing to Implement Sanctions In Accordance With the
Orders Dated September 12, 2013 and November 20, 2013.
The record in this case clearly sets forth Panagiotou's conduct in intentionally
continuously defying Judge Norton's orders on discovery. The actions of Panagiotou in this case
mirror his actions in the prior case. In this case however, the Court invoked strict compliance
with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. That notwithstanding, Panagiotou continued to defy the
Court's orders time and time again.
Eliopulos moved for sanctions against Panagiotou on May 22, 2013 and came before the
Court on August 28, 2013. The Court entered an Order Granting Defendants' (Eliopulos)
Motion for Sanctions on September 12, 2013. (R. 289).
The Court in its September 12, 2013 Order for Sanctions, in subparagraph 4, ordered:

"If these documents are not made available to the Defendant for inspection and/or
copying on September 13, 2013 at 10 a.m., pursuant to Rule 37(b), the court will consider this
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failure as a contempt of court and may enter an order of contempt, but the Court lJ!ill dismiss the

Plaintiff's Complaint and enter an order prohibiting the Plaintiff to oppose the counterclaim
filed in this case." (emphasis added).
On September 26, 2013, Eliopulos filed a second motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule
3 7(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, for an order issuing sanctions as specifically set
forth in the Court's Order of September 12, 2013 for the intentional and willful failure of the
Plaintiff to fully and completely comply regarding the production of documents ordered on
September 13, 2013. (emphasis added).
On November 20, 2013, the Court entered an Order Granting the Defendants' Second
Motion for Sanctions and also entered an Order of Contempt against the Plaintiff Panagiotou
consistent with the Court's Order of September 12, 2013. (R. 107,293). The court issued a wellreasoned decision regarding sanctions, concluding that it was ordering these sanctions upon its
own initiative because it found that Panagiotou had engaged in defiance of previous court orders
and filed false affidavits with the Court. Upon the Order being entered, Eliopulos assumed that
the Plaintiff's Complaint has been dismissed, and the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant Panagiotou was
barred from opposing Eliopulos' Counterclaim because the Order was fully consistent with the
Order of September 12, 2013.
On January 23, 2014, Eliopulos filed Eliopulos' Third Motion to Compel and for
Sanctions. (R. 126). Eliopulos also filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel and
for Sanctions. (R. 127). On February 4, 2014, Eliopulos filed a Reply Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Compel and for Sanctions. (R. 277).
On January 29, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in which he
opposed, and/or defended against, the Verified Counterclaim ofEliopulos in direct violation of
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the Court's orders of September 12, 2013 and November 20, 2013. The hearing on the motion
was set for March 6, 2014. The hearing on Eliopulos' motion to compel was set for February 6,
2014.
On February 7, 2014 the Court entered an Order Granting Eliopulos' filing of January 23,
2014 Titled Third Motion to Compel and for Sanctions. (R. 308). As the sanction entered
against Panagiotou, the Court dismissed his complaint with prejudice.
Eliopulos sought an order striking Panagiotou's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
and a ruling that the filing was in violation of the previous orders of the Court, and that Eliopulos
was not required to prepare and file a response thereto. The motion was denied. Eliopulos also
filed a motion pursuant to Rule 56(f) IRCP, to allow Eliopulos to complete discovery prior to
responding to the partial motion for summary judgment, but that motion was also denied.
The trial court has discretion to enter and award sanctions against a party; that award is subject to
review for an abuse of discretion. Magleby v. Garn, 154 Idaho 194, 196, 296 P.3d 400, 402
(2013). When we consider whether a trial court abused its discretion, the standard is whether the
court perceived the issue as discretionary, acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available, and reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. Id. at 196-97, 296 P.3d at 402-03.
"The standard of review for an appellate court reviewing a trial court's imposition of
sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11 or 37 is one of abuse of discretion." Campbell v. Ki/dew, 141
Idaho at 649-50, 115 P.3d at 740-41 (2005). Rule l l(a)(1) provides that, when appearing on a
filing with the court, [t]he signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the
attorney or party has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of the signer's
knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
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warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
The sanction must be significant enough to deter the misuse of the judicial process to
defeat the legitimate rights of the parties in litigation. In this case, Eliopulos believes that the
sanctions issued by the Court on September 12, 2013 and November 20, 2013 were entirely
appropriate. It is not the entering of sanctions that Eliopulos appeals, but rather, the
implementation of the sanctions not conforming with the Court's Orders. Those Orders, if
implemented consistently, would have been significant enough to deter Panagiotou's misuse of
the litigation process. The record herein shows that even after the entry of the Orders of
th

September 12 and November 201\ that Panagiotou still failed and refused to comply with the
Court directives. This is borne out by the Court's Order of February 7, 2014 wherein
Panagiotou's complaint was dismissed with prejudice. The failure of the Court to implement the
sanctions as set forth in the September 12, 2013 and November 20, 2013 Orders is reversible err.

VI.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Eliopulos respectfully requests that the decision of the lower
court be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
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DATED this~ day of February, 2015.
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